Winter 2003 Tentative
||Read Chapter 1 and do:
|| Interacting populations
||p. 33: 8, 9 and
Problems 2,3. Reading: Chapter 3
4,5. Optional reading for the week: Chapters 3 and 4 of
Olinick (on Baker reserve)
Hand in problem 3 on Monday the 13th.
||Voting theory (Guest lecturer)
a,b,c,d and For All Practical Purposes, p.186: 1a,b,c,
and one part of d.
Reading: Chapter 9 of For
All Practical Purposes and chapter 6 of Olinick.
|| Voting axioms
||For All Practical Purposes,
p.187: 2,3; Olinick, p. 192: 9, and p. 193: 19(The voting mechanism,
i.e. the function from the set of profiles to group rankings, that
you construct does not need to be "reasonable"; and
|| Proof of Arrow's
Problems to be handed in on Wednesday,
the 22nd: Problems a,b,c,d ,
Problem 6 and number 19,
page 193 of Olinick.
Due Monday the 27th or Wednesday the
29th: Problems 8 and 10
Problem 13 on Monday.
||Consistency of tournaments
11,12 and: How many transitive and cyclic triples does this
tournament (which is also on p. 83 of Roberts) have?
||End tournaments, start games
||Values of games
|More on voting
|More voting, Discussion
the 10th: 14(a) and one part of 14(b), i.e. either address the case
where m and n are both even, or when m is even and n odd,
or when m=n=3. Also, either 1. or 2. of These problems.
Problems 16 and 17 on Monday.
|Problems 19, 20
and 21 Wednesday's class should be helpful for 20 and
21, but you might start on these before it. There is now a Game
theory book on reserve by Binmore. Much of what we've done is in
chapter 1, and chapter 6 discusses mixed strategies.
|Start von Neumann's theorem
|nothing new, just the problems from
|Proof of von Neumann's
in Problems 19 and 21 on Monday.
to hand in on Monday. Last assignment due on Friday, the
Hand in (under my office
door, 312 Bradley) problem 25 anytime Friday.