| I | II | III | IV | V |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 30 | 18 | 10 | 18 | 24 |
| A | A | C | C | B |
| B | C | A | B | C |
| C | B | B | A | A |

1. Who wins under plurality voting?
2. Who wins using the Borda Count?
3. Who wins using Single Transferable Vote (STV)?
4. Which of the groups ( $\mathrm{I}-\mathrm{V}$ ) could gain by voting strategically if the election uses the Borda Count, assuming the other groups vote sincerely? How many in the group would need to vote strategically?
5. For one of your answers to question 4 (there may be only one answer-I haven't checked), can you find another group that would be unhappy with the outcome that results from that strategic voting. Could this group vote insincerely so as to produce, for its members, a better outcome? Does this suggest a game between two groups?
6. Which of the groups could gain by voting strategically if the election uses STV? How many in the group would need to vote strategically?
7. I believe there are two answers to question 6 . What happens if both groups vote strategically? Comments welcome!
